A wage earners' investment fund under steady-state inflation and growth / 143 by Brems, Hans

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/wageearnersinves143brem

Faculty Working Papers
A WAGE EARNERS' INVESTMENT FUND UNDER
STEADY-STATE INFLATION AND GROWTH
Hans Brems
#1*3
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urban a -Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
October 22, 1973
A WAGE EARNERS' INVESTMENT FUND UNDER
STEADY-STATE INFLATION AND GROWTH
Hans Brems
#1^3
Copyright 1973-
For private circulation only.
Criticism invited.

Hans Brems
Box 99 Commerce West
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois 61801
USA
A WAGE EARNERS' INVESTMENT FUND UNDER STEADT- STATE INFLATION AND GROWTH
By HANS BREMS
Summary
To a vage earners* Investment fund all employers contribute compulse
orlly a fraction of their wage bill. To the employees the fund Issues
nonnegotlable fund certificates* redeemable after a specified number
of years. Within the framework of a simple neoclassical model of
steady-state inflation and growth and using Danish data, the article
determines the else of such a fund as well as its effects upon the
marginal productivity of capital, disposable-income distribution between
capital and labor, the propensity to save national output, and the real
wage rate.

- ii -
A WAGE EARNERS' INVESTMENT FUND UNDER STEADY-STATE INFLATION AND GROWTH
By HANS BREMS
Contents
I. A WAGE EARNERS' INVESTMENT FUND 1
II. NOTATION 3
III. THE EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL 5
1. Definitions 5
2. Production 6
3. Absolute Size of Fund 7
4. Disposable-Income Distribution between Labor and Capital 9
5. Consumption 12
6. Equilibrium 12
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR PROPORTIONATE RATES OF GROWTH 13
V. PHYSICAL MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY K AND INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN \ 15
VI. A TRANSCENDENTAL EQUATION IN PHYSICAL MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY K 18
VII. EMPIRICAL VALUES OF PARAMETERS 19
VIII. NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS FOR LEVELS 20
1. The Physical Marginal Productivity of Capital 20
2. Disposable-Income Distribution between Labor and Capital 27
3. The Propensity to Save National Output 28
:.
- iii -
4. The Real Wage Rate 29
5. Relative Size of Fund 30
IX. THE SOUNDNESS OF SOME UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS 30
1. Prompt Redemption 31
2. Identical Motivation of Wage Earners and Capitalist-Entrepren-
eurs 31
APPENDIX
THE EXISTENCE OF A UNIQUE AND POSITIVE SOLUTION OF EQUATION (60) 3*
1. The Function (e fp - l)/f 34
2. The Brace of Eq. (60) 36
3. The Entire Eq. (60) 37
FOOTNOTES 38
REFERENCES 40
Figure 1 23
Figure 2 24
Figure 3 25
Figure 4 26
Figure 5 35

October 16, 1973
A WAGE EARNERS* INVESTMENT
FUND UNDER STEADY-STATE
I N F LATION AND GROWTH
Bv_ HANS BREMS*
With the purpose of paring down consumer demand to wartime output
of consumers' goods, Keynes proposed, in How to Pay for the War [9],
a "deferred-pay" scheme calling for £550 million in annual compulsory
saving. The complete scheme, including "the accumulation of working
-class wealth under working-class control," would embody, Keynes said
in his preface, "an advance towards economic equality greater than any
which we have made in recent times."
U. S. labor unions often find themselves at odds with the administ-
ration on questions of national economic policy. By contrast, Western
European labor unions are used to influencing national policy by working
with the government, Barbash [2]« An example of such collaboration is
the re-emergence in Western Europe of the Keynesian idea a third of a
century later under a new name and serving new purposes.
I. A WA6E EARNERS' INVESTMENT FUND
Serving the dual purpose of giving labor a share of, first, the
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capital gains accruing to stockholders in an inflationary economy
and, second, the co-determination rights inherent in stock ownership,
a wage earners' investment fund would work as follows. Primarily
in the form of corporate stock all employers would contribute
compulsorily a fraction of their waga bill to the fund. The fur;'!
would belong to the employees. To the individual employees, in
turn, the fund would issue nonnegotiable fund certificates. A
specified number of years after its issue a fund certificate would
become redeemable in cash at a price which would include the share
of that certificate in all capital gains and dividends made by the
fund during the lifetime of the certificate. The fund would be
allowed to sell contributed corporate stock at any time and buy
other stock.
Neither in Europe itself nor in the U. S . has the idea attract-
ed theoretical interest. In view of its sheer order of magnitude
and cf its simultaneous emergence in several advanced countries,
this might seem surprising. The purpose of the present article is
to make a beginning by analyzing the effects of a wage earners'
investment fund upon the physical marginal productivity of capital,
disposabls-income distribution between labor and capital, the pro-
pensity to save national output, and the real wage rate.
What would be a suitable theoretical framework for our analysis?
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From the purposes of the fund it follows that our model should be
capable of accommodating inflation and that its capitalists should
be stockholders rather than bondholders. We choose the simplest
possible one-sector neoclassical model of steady-state inflation and
growth. Its capitalists are capitalist-entrepreneurs producing a
single good from labor and an immortal capital stock of that good,
hence investment is the act of setting aside part of output for
installation as capital stock. Capital stock is the result of
accumulated savings voluntary as well as forced. Technology,
available labor force, and the money wage rate are growing autonom-
ously.
What would be a suitable institutional framework? For numerical
solution of our key transcendental equation we shall need empirical
values of parameters and shall use stylized Danish ones.
II. ROTATION
Variables
c = propensity to consume national output
C = consumption
$ s size of wage earners* investment fund relative to capital stock
* = absolute size of wage earners* investment fund
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g = proportionate rate of growth of variable v = c, C, $, I, t,
ic, L, P, S, 8, W, X, Y^ Y
2
, and Y
I = investment
i = internal rate of return
k 5 present gross worth of a physical unit of capital stock
< = physical marginal productivity of capital stock
L = labor employed
v = propensity to save national output
P = price of good
r = discount rate applied by capitalist-entrepreneurs
S = physical capital stock
5 disposable-income to output ratio, called "the payout ratio"
W r wage bill including employers' contribution to fund per year
X = physical output
Y = disposable money income
Z = profits bill
Parameters
a, 8 - exponents of production function
b = employers* contribution to fund as a fraction of wage bill
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c, = propensity to consume national disposable real income
e = Euler*s number, the base of natural logarithms
F = available labor force
g = proportionate rate of growth of parameter p = F, M, and w
M = multiplicative factor of production function
p = redemption period
w = money wage rate including employers' contribution to fund per
nan year
Parameters listed are stationary except F, M, and w, whose growth
rates g , g„, and g are stationary. Time coordinates are t and T.
The unit of time is the year.
III. THE EQUATIONS OF THE MODEL
1. Definitions
Fifteen variable growth rates are listed in Sec. II. To all apply
the definition
dv 1
(1) through (15) g = — -
dt v
Define investment as the derivative of capital stock with
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respect to time
:
(16) I = dS/dt
2 . Production
Let the capitalist-entrepreneurs apply the Cobb-Douglas
production function
(17) X = HLaS 3
where < a < 1; < < 1 ; a + 3 = 1; and M > 0. Define the money
wage rate w as including employers' contribution per man year to the
investment fund. Then let profit maximization under pure competition
equalize real wage rate and physical marginal productivity of labor:
w 3X X
(18) - = — = a -
P dh L
Physical marginal productivity of capital is defined:
3X X
(19) k = — = e -
3S S
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Multiply (19) by price of output P to find value marginal
productivity of capital. Define money profits earned on each
physical unit of capital stock S as its value marginal productivity
Then multiply by S to find money profits earned on capital stock S
(20) Z = *CPS = 0PX
Under full employment, available labor force must equal labor
employed:
(21) F = L
Define the wage bill as the money wage rate times employment:
(22) W = wL
3 . Absolute Size of Fund
At time t, let the employers contribute the amount bW(t) to
the wage earners' investment fund. Let bW(x, t) be the value at
time T of the amount bW(t) contributed at time t. How does bW(t)
grow to become bW(x, t)? Assume the wage earners to have the same
motivation and skill as the capitalist-entrepreneurs hence, like
the capitalist-entrepreneurs, to be making the internal rate of
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return i on the money value of the capital stock they own, i. e.
the wage earners' investment fund. Let the earnings of the fund
be compounded continuously, then
l(T - t)
(23) bW(T, t) = e bW(t)
Let all wage earners present their fund certificates for
redemption as soon as the latter become redeemable. Redemption
at time T is the accumulated value at time T of the contribution
made at time T - p, where p is the redemption period. The size
of the fund at time T is the value at time T of all contributions
made from t=T-ptot=T:
(24) $(T) = /* bW(T, t)dt
The wage bill out of which the contributions to the fund are
made, is growing at the proportionate rate gw , hence
gw
(T - t)
(25) W(T) = e W W(t)
Insert (23) and (25) into (24) and find the size of the fund
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(1 * gH )(T - t)
(26) <Mt) = /.J _ e
w bW(T)dt
The integration would be facilitated by assuming the internal
rate of return I and the proportionate rate of growth of the wage
bill g to be stationary:
(27) di/dt =
(28) dg
w
/dt =
The integration will have to be carried out separately for I r
g and i = g„. Find all variables in the outcome referring to the
same time x, purge it of x, and write the size of the fund
(l - gw )P
(29) * = bW[e - l]/(\ - gw ) for I i gw
« = bWp for i = gw
«+
. Disposable- Income Distribution between Labor and Capital
Redemption at time x is the accumulated value at time x of the
contribution made at time x - p. That value we write bW(x, x - p)
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and define labor's disposable income at time T as the wage bill minus
contribution plus redemption at that time:
Y (t) = W(t) - bW(x) + bW(T, x - p)
Insert (25) into (23), replace t by T p, and find redemption
(l " gw )P
bW(x, T - p) = e bW(T)
Use this, (18), and (22) to write labor's disposable income
(30) Y. =6
1
PX, where
(i - gw )P
1
= a + abCe - 1]
The capitalist-entrepreneurs are making the internal rate of
return i on the money value of the capital stock they own, i. e., all
capital stock minus the wage earners' investment fund. The internal
rate of return \ includes profits and capital gains, as we shall see in
2Eq. (57) in Sec. V. Follow convention and exclude capital gains from
disposable income. According to (20) profits are earned at the rate k,
so define disposable income of the capitalist-entrepreneurs as
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Y 2 k(PS - $)
Remembering the two separate forms of (29), insert (18), (20), (22),
and (29) and write the disposable income of the capitalist-entrepreneurs
(31) Y
2
= 6
2
PX, where
(i - gw )P
6
2
= 6 - ab<[e - l]/(i - gw ) for i i gw
9
2
= 8 - ab<p for * = gw
Add (30) and (31) and find national disposable money income
(32) Y = Y
]L
+ Y
2
= 6PX, where
<* " gw )P
6 = 9
1
+ 6
2
= 1 + ab(i - gw - K)[e - l]/(i - gw ) for 1 4 gw
6=e 1 +e 2 =l- abKp for \ = gw
is a disposable-income to output ratio, a "payouf'ratio.
•
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5 . Consumption
Let the parameter c, be the propensity to consume national
disposable real income:
(33) C = c,Y/P
a
Define the variable c as the propensity to consume national
output
:
(31) C = cX
Take (32), (33), and (3H) together and find
(35) c = c„8
Define the variable v as the propensity to save national
output
(36) V = 1 - c
6
. Equilibrium
Finally, output equilibrium requires output to equal the sum
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of consumption and investment demand for it
(37) X = C + I
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR PROPORTIONATE RATES OF GROWTH
Define, as Hahn and Matthews [8] did, steady-state growth as
stationary proportionate rates of growth. Our system (1) through
(37) possesses the following set of steady-state solutions:
(38) g =
c
(39)
(40)
(41)
g
c
g
x
g
<&
gw
g
I
g
x
(42) g =
(43) g =
.
(44)
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St. = 6i
(45) Si gw - g„/«
(46) T + gM /C<
(47) =
(48) g W T + gw
(49) gX g !
(50) gYl gW
(51) gY2 'W
(52) g v = gW
To convince himself that those are indeed solutions, the
reader should take derivatives with respect to time of (16)
through (37). He should then use the definitions (1) through
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(15), insert the solutions (38) through (52), and convince himself
that each equation is satisfied. Thus our auxiliary assumptions
(27) and (28) consistent with (42) and (48), respectively have
paid off handsomely. But there is more to growth theory than finding
proportionate rates of growth. Our purpose was to find the effects
of a wage earners' investment fund upon the physical marginal
productivity of capital, disposable-income distribution between
labor and capital, the propensity to save national output, and the
real wage rate. Those effects are effects upon levels in a growing
economy. In determining such levels our solutions for proportionate
rates of growth (38) through (52) will be useful.
V. PHYSICAL MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY K AND INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN l
According to our solution (43) a physical unit of capital stock
added at time T would have the physical marginal productivity K at
any time from t = t to t = ». What sort of value marginal product-
ivity will it have? Let it be perfectly foreseen by the entrepren-
eurs that price is growing at the proportionate rate g :
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gp(t ~ T)
(53) P(t) = e P(T)
But let the capitalist-entrepreneurs be purely competitive
ones, hence price is beyond their control. At time t, value
marginal productivity is, then
a[p(t)x(t)]
= P(t)K
as(t)
As seen from the present time t, value marginal productivity at
time t is e P(t)ic, where r is the discount rate applied by
the capitalist-entrepreneurs. Define present gross worth k at time
t of the physical unit of capital stock as the present worth of all
its future value marginal productivities
:
(54) k(T) = /" e" r(t "" T) P(t)Kdt
Let the rate of inflation be less than the discount rate:
(55) g p < r
Insert (53) into (54) and use (55) to carry out the integration
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Since in the outcome all variables refer to the same time T, we
may purge it of T
:
(56) k = PK/(r - gp )
Define the present net worth of the physical unit of capital
stock as gross worth minus price:
n = [»c/(r - gp )
- 1]P
Define the internal rate of return i as that value of r which
makes net worth equal to zero, hence
(57) l = K + gp
where g stands for (45). In an inflationary economy, then, the
internal rate of return of a physical unit of capital stock equals
the physical marginal productivity of that unit plus the proportion-
ate rate of capital gain (45).
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VI. A TRANSCENDENTAL EQUATION IN PHYSICAL MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY K
Use (34), (36), and (37) to find I = vX and (1) through (16) to
find that I = ggS, hence S = VX/g . Insert that into (19) and find
(58) K = 3g
s
/v
Insert (45), (46), (48), and (57) into l - gw and find
(59) I - gw = k - g s
Remembering the two separate forms of (32), insert (32), (35),
(36), and (59) into (58) and find the transcendental equation in k:
<k - g Q )P
(60) k{(1 - cd )/g s + abcd Ce
&
- l]/(»c - gg)} = 3 for i t gw
<{(1 - Cd^/S s + abc d p} = for I = gy
An explicit solution of (60) is beyond reach. But our appendix
proves the existence of a unique and positive solution for K. And
once we had empirical values of the parameters entering (60) we could
find that solution numerically. Let us choose such values, then.
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VII. EMPIRICAL VALUES OP PARAMETERS
Denmark is one country currently considering a wage earners'
investment fund, so let us choose stylized Danish values of the
parameters entering (60). The relevant wage bill is the wage
bill of employees alone not including the estimated wage bill
of proprietors. In this narrow sense labor's share of Danish national
income is one-half, Det cikonomiske Rad [6], 40, and we shall use that
value for a thereby in effect classifying all proprietors' income
as a return to capital and thus exaggerating the physical marginal
productivity of capital now to be determined.
1953-69 Denmark's net domestic fixed asset formation in 1963
prices was 13.1% of her net national product in 1963 prices, Brems
O], 33-39, or roughly 1/8. If, like a conventional neoclassical
growth model, Denmark had had neither a government nor a wage earners*
investment fund, her propensity to consume national disposable real
income would have been roughly 7/8.
1960-69 the Danish labor force in terms of number of men
was growing at 1% per annum, Det 0konomiske Rad [5], 55, but hours
per man are now declining by the same percentage, Det 0konomiske Rad
[7], 80. Technological progress is perhaps 2% per annum, so
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let us adopt
a = 1/2
c
d
= 7/8
gF
=
gM
= 1/50
From our assumption that a + S = 1 and from (46) it follows that
B = 1/2
g
s
= 1/25
VIII. NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS FOR LEVELS
1# The Physical Marginal Productivity of Capital
Insert our empirical Danish parameter values into our transcendent
al equation (60) and find
(k - 0.0U)p
(61) k{50 + 7b[e - l]/(< - 0.04)} -8=0
Eq. (61) contains the two structural characteristics of a wage
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earners' investment fund, i. e
.
, b = employers' contribution as a
fraction of the wage bill and p = the redemption period. Both
the Danish bill, Arbe jdsministeriet El], 1, and the union proposal,
Landsorganisationen [10], 37, suggested a contribution fraction
of 5%. The bill, Arbe j dsministeriet [1], 2, suggested a redemption
period of seven years, whereas the union proposal, Landsorganisationen
[10], 38, suggested a five-year redemption period. We should like
to examine a rather wide range of alternative structural character-
istics of such a fund, say
b = 1/80, 1/40, 1/20, and 1/10
p = 2, 4, 8, and 16
Inserting these alternative values into (61), can the latter
be solved for K? Indeed it can and was, using an IBM 360/75 at
the Computer Services Office of the University of Illinois, The
results are shown in Column 3 of Table 1 and in Figure 1. As
one would expect, the higher the employers' contribution fraction
b and the longer the redemption period p are, the lower is the
physical marginal productivity of capital stock jc . But the
elasticities of the latter with respect to b and p apparent as
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thc steepness of the curves on their double-logarithmic scale are
modest in the range considered politically. Beyond b = 1/20 and
p = 8 they become noticeably higher.
2. Disposable - Income Distribution between Labor and Capital
Insert (59) into (30) through (32) and write the payout ratios
(62)
(K - g )p
6 = a + ab[e - 1]
(63) 9
2
= 8 - abK[e b - 1]/(K - g
s
)
(64)
(K - g q )p6=1- abg
s
Ce
&
- 1]/(k - g g )
Here are two opposing forces at work: Rising b or p will at
the same time make (62) rise and (63) and (64) fall (because b and
p are rising) and make (62) fall and (63) and (64) rise, because
k is falling! But the former force wins in the practical range,
as seen from Columns 4 through 6 of Table 1 and from Figure 2:
The higher the employers' contribution fraction b and the longer
the redemption period p are, the higher is labor's payout ratio
and the lower is that of the capitalist-entrepreneurs. Labor wins,
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and the capitalist-entrepreneurs lose. But labor wins slightly less
than the capitalist-entrepreneurs are losing, so the overall ratio
is lower. The elasticities of the payout ratios of labor and the
capitalist-entrepreneurs with respect to b and p are considerable,
especially beyond b = 1/20 and p = 8. We conclude that the
redistributive effects of a wage earners' investment fund may well
be considerable.
3 * The Propensity to Save National Output
Insert (35) and (6*0 into (36) and write the propensity to save
national output
(< - g<,)o
(65) v = 1 - c
d
+ abc
dg s [e
b
- 1]/(k - g g )
Again, two opposing forces are at work: Rising b or p will at
the same time make (65) rise, because b and p are rising and fall,
because k is falling! But the former force wins in the practical
range, as seen from Column 7 of Table 1 and from Figure 3: The
higher the employers' contribution fraction b and the longer the
redemption period p are, the higher is the propensity to save national
output. The elasticities of the latter with respect to b and p are
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modest in the range considered politically. Beyond b = 1/20 and
p = 8 they become noticeably higher.
4. The Real Wage Rate
Use (34), (36), and (37) to find I = VX and (1) through (16)
to find that I = g S, hence S = vX/g . Insert that into (17),
insert the outcome into (18) and find the real wage rate
(66) w/P = a[M(v/g
s
)
3
]
1/a
including, we recall, employers' contribution per man hour to the
wage earners' investment fund. Using our empirical parameter
values a = $ = 1/2 we find the elasticity $/ct of the real wage
rate with respect to the propensity to save national output to be
unity a particularly simple Wicksell Effect. Consequently, the
elasticities of the real wage rate with respect to b and p would
be the same as those of the propensity to save national output,
apparent from Figure 3, and it is unnecessary to draw a separate
diagram for the real wage rate.
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5 . Relative Size of Fund
Insert (18), (20), (22), (58), and (59) into (29) and write size
of the fund
(67) $ = <f>PS, where
(k - g<;)p
4> H abggCe & - 13/C(k - g s )v]
There are several opposing forces at work here: Rising b or p
will at the same time make (67) rise, because b and p are rising,
and fall, because K is falling and v rising. But the former force
wins very easily in the practical range, as seen from Column 8 of
Table 1 and from Figure 4: The higher the employers* contribution
fraction b and the longer the redemption period p are, the larger
is the investment fund as s fraction of the value of capital stock.
The elasticities of the fraction
<J> with respect to b and p are
considerable.
IX. THE SOUNDNESS OF SOME UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
Sr.ch conclusive findings are, no doubt, the results of
:
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using both a very simple growth model and very simple underlying
assumptions about the behavior of wage earners owning an investment
fund. Let us discuss briefly the soundness of two such assumptions.
1 . Prompt Redemption
We have assumed wage earners to present their fund certificates
for redemption as soon as the latter become redeemable. Much of
the redemption is a capital gain, and our knowledge of the disposal
of capital gains is sporadic, Bhatia [33. Keynes would have question-
ed our assumption: "The argument is, I suppose, that savings def-
erred in this way are more likely than normal savings to be spent
by their owners as soon as they are free to do so. How far this
will prove to be true in fact, I am not sure. It may be that the
blocked deposits will be instrumental in spreading the habit of
small savings more widely...," Keynes [0], *+7. Because Keynes* prop-
osal was adopted to less than a quarter of his suggested sum, Maital
[12], 166, and because it was adopted under wartime conditions, the
issue remained unsettled.
2
.
Identical Motivations of Wage Earners and Capital 1st -Entrepreneurs
We have assumed wage earners to have the same motivation and
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skill as the capitalist-entrepreneurs, hence to be earning the
sane internal rate of return on the capital they own. Leaving
aside skill, is the assumption of identical motivation a sound
one? Two observations are in order.
First, the Danish union proposal, Landsorganisat ionen [10],
Sec. 14, as well as the Danish bill, Arbe jdsministeriet [1], Sec.
22, specifically demand an "active" placement of the fund and
define "active" as a placement guaranteeing, first, a share of
the capital gains of the economy and, second, a maximum dividend.
So far, then, our assumption of identical motivation seems sound.
Second, however, such a motivation would require the fund
to sell quite a bit of the contributed corporate stock and buy
other stock. The reason is an inherent anomaly in the fund: Con-
tributions are in proportion to the wage bill, hence less capital
-intensive firms with less investment need will contribute
proportionately more than more capital-intensive ones with more
investment need. Maximization of capital gains would require the
fund to buy stock in more capital-intensive firms and sell stock
in less capital-intensive ones, in less rapidly growing ones, and
in less well-managed ones. But the employees of less capital
-intensive, less rapidly growing, or less well-managed firms are
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the very ones whose employment is most vulnerable. To such employees
the exercise of their co-determination rights may well look like a
last defense to be taken away from them if the fund sells "their"
stock! They would no doubt demand a hearing, and such a hearing is
indeed suggested in an official comment to the Danish bill,
Arbe jdsministeriet Cl], 22. Hearing or no hearing, a conflict remains
between the interests of the wage earner qua owner of the investment
fund and qua holder of a particular job. Or, which is the same
thing, a conflict remains between the two purposes of a wage earners'
investment fund, i. e., giving labor a share of, first, the capital
gains and, second, the co-determination rights inherent in stock
ownership* If widespread, such a conflict could play havoc with our
assumption of identical motivation in wage earners and capitalist
-entrepreneurs
.
•
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APPENDIX
THE EXISTENCE OP A UNIQUE AND POSITIVE SOLUTION OP EQUATION (60)
1. The Function (e fp - l)/f
Define f = ic - g_. Then Eq. (60) has in it a function G(f) defined
9
G(f) = (e fp - l)/f for f j*
G(0) = p for f =
Assume p > 0. Then G(0) is positive. And G(f) is positive for
f < 0, because then e < 1, and also positive for f > 0, because then
e
fp
> 1. The limit of G(f) for f + is found by L»Hopital*s Rule:
liraG(f) = p
f+0
But if G(f) has both the value and the limit p at f = 0, it is
continuous at f = 0. The function is shown in Figure 5.
To see how G(f) varies with f, differentiate with respect to f:
(68)
d[(e fp - l)/f] fpe fp - (e fp - 1) e" fp - (1 - fp
)
df f* e
" fp
f 2
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The denominator of (68) is nonnegative: It is positive for all
values of f other than f = 0, for which it is zero. The numerator is
also nonnegative. Write it u = e - (1 - x), where x = fp. Take
the derivative du/dx = - e +1, set it equal to zero, and find
9 o —X
x = 0. Take the second derivative d u/dx = e > 0. Consequently
u satisfies the first-order and second-order conditions for a minimum
at x = 0: u is positive for all values of f other than f = 0, for
which it is zero. For f = the limit of the derivative (68) can be
found by using L*Hopital's Rule twice:
d[(e fp - l)/f] p 2
lim < = —
f+0 df 2
which is positive.
2# The Brace of Eq . (60)
The brace of Eq. (60) may be written
(69) (1 - c,)/g + abc JG(f)u S a
Realistically assume that
< a < 1
< b
•
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< c, < 1
a
< g
s
< p
Then the brace (69) is positive for all values of f. At f = it
has both the value and the limit (1 - c,)/g_ + abc,p, hence is contin-
a S a
uous
.
3. The Entire Eq. (60)
But if the brace is always positive, then k times the brace is
negative, zero, and positive for k < 0, k = 0, and k > 0, respect-
ively. Moreover, since the derivative (68) has a positive limit at
k » g and is positive at all other values of k, the brace is rising
with rising k, and K times the brace is rising in more than proportion
to jc. Consequently, if we draw the left-hand side of (60) as a function
of k, the function will be continuous, will be located in the third
quadrant for < < 0, will pass through the origin for k = 0, and will
be located in the first quadrant for k > 0. It is rising without
bounds as k rises without bounds.
The right-hand side of (60) can be drawn as a horizontal line at
the positive distance from the K-axis. Curve and line must inter-
sect, will do so only once, and will do so in the first quadrant. This
proves the existence of a unique and positive solution for k.
'.
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FOOTNOTES
^Professor of economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
The author is indebted, first, to Mr. Robert T. Peterson, Research
Assistant at the Statistical Services Unit of the Computer Services
Office, for having written a program solving our transcendental
equation (61). The author is indebted, second, to the Computer Services
Office of the University of Illinois for the use of its IBM 360/75
equipment in the actual numerical solution of that equation. The
author is indebted, third, to Mr. Hideo Hashimoto, a graduate student
at the University of Illinois, for reading an earlier draft of the
appendix and suggesting valuable improvements of it.
If the employer contribution is a fixed fraction of the wage bill,
let us call it an investment wage; if it is a fixed fraction of the
profits bill, let us call it profit sharing; and if it is a fixed
fraction of equity , let us call it equity sharing.
An investment wage is on the statute books of the German Federal
Republic (since 1961) and Italy, constituted a bill, Arbe jdsministeriet
[1], before the Danish Parliament in 1973, and was proposed by labor
in the Netherlands in 1964 and by Professor Lundberg [11] in Sweden in
1973. Profit sharing is on the statute books of France (since 1967)
and proposed by labor in the Netherlands also in 1964. Equity sharing
was proposed by labor in Britain in 1973. The present article confines
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itself to the investment wage.
Convention is possibly ill-advised, Bhatia [3]
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